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Abstract
Psychologists and economists have examined the effect of cognitive load in a variety
of situations from risk taking to snack choice. We review previous experiments that
have directly manipulated cognitive load and summarize their findings. We report the
results of two new experiments where participants engage in a digit-memorization task
while simultaneously performing a variety of economic tasks including: (1) choices
involving risk, (2) choices involving intertemporal substitution, (3) choices with an-
choring effects, (4) choices over healthy and unhealthy snacks, and (5) math problems.
We find that higher cognitive load reduces numeracy as measured by performance in
math problems. Moreover, within-subject analysis indicates that cognitive load leads
to more risk-averse behavior, more impatience over money, and (nominally) more like-
lihood to anchor. We do not find any evidence that cognitive load increases impatience
over consumption goods or unhealthy snack choices. Exploiting the panel nature of
our data set, we find that those individuals who are most sensitive to cognitive load, as
measured by a large drop in their own math performance across 1- and 8-digit memo-
rization treatments, are driving much of the effect.
∗The authors wish to thank Daniel Benjamin, Kristine Brown, Jeff Butler, Colin Camerer, Stefano Della-
Vigna, David Dickinson, Daniel Kahneman, Botond Kőszegi, David Laibson, George Loewenstein, Sendhil
Mullainathan, and Richard Thaler for their insightful comments. We are also grateful to Xirong Chen, Joshua
Foster, and Valerie Spaink for their invaluable research assistance. Contact Info: Cary Deck, Department of
Economics, Sam M. Walton College of Business, Business Building 402, Fayetteville, AR 72701-1201, USA,
cdeck@walton.uark.edu; Salar Jahedi, RAND Corporation, 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica,
CA 90407-2138, USA, sjahedi@rand.org
1 Introduction
Identifying how individuals make decisions under uncertainty, how they make intertemporal
trade-offs, and the extent to which their judgments are influenced by context are core com-
ponents of understanding economic decisionmaking. Increasingly it has been demonstrated
that individuals deviate systematically from classic assumptions; namely, they exhibit too
much risk-aversion, they are overly impatient in the short-run, and they use non-informative
cues in making decisions. Such deviations are often modeled by researchers as behavioral
preferences (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006; Laibson, 1997; Tversky and Simonson, 1993), with
the implicit notion that these preferences are stable within the individual. However, there is
a large body of research suggesting that the expression of such preferences depend critically
on the cognitive resources available to the decision maker. For example, people of high cogni-
tive ability, as measured by their IQ score, are found to be more risk-tolerant, more patient,
and less prone to anchoring effects than those with lower cognitive ability (Frederick, 2005;
Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin et al., 2013; Bergman et al., 2010).
Cross-sectional studies typically encounter difficulties in pinning down the causal rela-
tionship between cognitive resources and decisions. Experimental research can shed light
on this causal link by exogenously impairing cognitive resources in the lab. Researchers
have employed several techniques to generate cognitive load; the most common method is to
have subjects hold a 6-or-more-digit number in their memory while simultaneously making
choices. The survey section of this paper reviews evidence of how performance across a vari-
ety of economic tasks is affected in experimental settings that directly manipulate cognitive
load. Across studies, it appears that increasing cognitive load leads to poorer reasoning and
math performance, more risk-aversion, and more impatient choices, although the evidence is
mixed for each of these. Most experimental studies examining cognitive load focus on a sin-
gle type of task and often have small samples and hypothetical stakes. A notable exception
is the paper by Benjamin et al. (2013) which utilizes a series of hand-run experiments to
test whether 7-digit number memorization affects performance on risk, patience, selfishness,
and analytical tasks using a between-subjects design. While they are unable to definitively
show that their number-memorization task was successful at impacting cognitive load (per-
formance in the analytical task did not vary by treatment), their findings do indicate that
subjects in the 7-digit treatment are more risk-averse than subjects with no memorization
task.
Dual-system theories (Kahneman 2002; Kahneman 2011) offer a mechanism by which
cognitive load can impact behavior. In this framework, people have an impulsive “intuitive”
system and a cool “reasoning” system. When required to make a decision, the intuitive
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system quickly reaches a decision that the reasoning system can override for a cost. Insofar
as risk-averse or impatient behavior is impulsive and undesirable and cognitive resources are
abundant, the reasoning system can repress those preferences from being exhibited. Placing
a person under cognitive load increases the workload of the reasoning system and hinders
its ability to regulate choice, leading to less reasoned behavior. A number of models have
operationalized these predictions (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006; Mukherjee, 2010).
Our paper reports the results of two experiments in which subjects are placed under cog-
nitive load and asked a series of questions spanning multiple tasks. We improve on Benjamin
et al. (2013) by using a larger sample size, exposing subjects to a different memorization
problem for each question, and successfully manipulating cognitive ability, as measured by a
drop in performance in a math task. The major contribution of our study, however, is that
we employ a within-subjects design to test whether cognitive load has a systematic effect
on individuals across multiple tasks. That is, we ask whether the same individuals whose
arithmetic performance suffers most under cognitive load are the same individuals whose
performances suffer in other tasks as well.
Our Experiment 1 reports on a computerized experiment that tests the causal effect that
increased cognitive load has on (1) an incentivized arithmetic question, (2) an incentivized
binary choice between a safe option and a risky gamble, (3) a hypothetical binary choice
between two monetary sums paid at different times, and (4) an incentivized counting task
with an uninformative anchor. In our first experiment, participants are given either a 1-digit
or an 8-digit number to memorize and are incentivized to keep that number in their memory
while completing a randomly determined task. The data show that an individual is more
likely to make arithmetic mistakes, act risk-averse, and be susceptible to anchoring in the
8-digit treatment as compared to the 1-digit treatment. The results are driven mainly by
those individuals who are most sensitive to cognitive load – defined as individuals whose
math performance in the 8-digit treatment diminished the greatest when compared to their
own math performance in the 1-digit treatment. Our findings for these incentivized tasks
generally corroborate the existing literature, but the hypothetical intertemporal decision
task does not. There we find that people become more patient when memorizing an 8-digit
number. Furthermore, the result is mainly driven by those individuals least sensitive to
cognitive load.
To explore why we find the puzzling results regarding patience, we conduct Experiment
2 using real stakes. Because this study involves intertemporal decisions, the subjects are
required to sign up for two sessions exactly one week apart.1 We used the same general format
1One downside of using real stakes is that there is uncertainty from receiving future payoffs and this
uncertainty can make impatience difficult to differentiate from risk-aversion. Experiment 1 uses hypothetical
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as Experiment 1, where participants are incentivized to memorize a number, then complete
a task, and then recall the number. Four tasks were included in the second experiment: (1)
a money impatience task, (2) a consumption impatience task, (3) an immediate snack choice
task, and (4) a delayed snack choice task. In both of the impatience tasks, subjects had to
make an incentivized binary choice between a small amount of money/snack today vs. a
larger amount of money/snack in one week. In both of the snack choice tasks, subjects had
to make an incentivized binary choice between a healthy or unhealthy snack that is awarded
either immediately or in one week. The latter tasks are an attempt to replicate and extend
Shiv and Fedorikhin’s (1999) study, which found that cognitive load led to more unhealthy
food choice. Selecting the unhealthy snack can be interpreted as being impatient since the
subject is trading off immediate gratification against longer term health. Because Shiv and
Fedorikhin had suggested physical proximity to the food is important, this study was hand-
run. In one treatment subjects were shown the actual food which would be received during
the session. In the other, subjects were shown pictures of food which would be received in
one week.2 The results of the second experiment reverse the results from the hypothetical
task in Experiment 1: people under higher cognitive load acted more impatiently for real
money. However we found no evidence that cognitive load affected choices in any of the
food treatments. That is, we are unable to find that cognitive load affected impatience over
consumption nor were we able to corroborate Shiv and Fedorikhin’s finding that cognitive
load is associated with more unhealthy snack choice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a survey of the
literature on cognitive load experiments. Section 3 discusses the methodology and results
from Experiment 1. Section 4 discusses the methodology and results from Experiment 2.
Section 5 makes concluding remarks.
2 Cognitive Load Literature Survey
The idea that individuals have limited cognitive resources is well established in psychology.
Cognitive resources can be depleted in many ways. Imposing a burden on working memory
has been shown to have adverse effects on performance in a variety of tasks that involve
logic or reasoning. Miller (1956) argues that people are able to hold only about seven (±
stakes to equalize uncertainty regarding payments. In Experiment 2 we attempt to minimize the uncertainty
of future payoffs by requiring that everybody return in one week to collect the bulk of their show-up fee.
2The first experiment consisted of 1-digit and 8-digit treatment groups. The second experiment consisted
of three within subject treatments: no memorization, 2-digit memorization and 8-digit memorization. These
changes were due to a desire to be compatible with previous studies on food choice and to allow for the
possibility that any number memorization constituted some cognitive load.
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2) items in their short-term memory at once, after which performance can greatly suffer.
Some studies suggest that having too many options can have the same effect. Indeed, menus
containing too many options are often associated with poor choices, even when stakes are
large such as choosing retirement savings and health insurance plans (Iyengar et al., 2004;
Schram and Sonnemans, 2011; Abaluck and Gruber, 2011). A set of recent papers (Besedeš
et al., 2012; Besedeš et al., 2014) find experimental evidence that subjects are less likely to
select objectively optimal options from larger choice sets than from smaller ones, and that
the way that options are presented can alleviate this effect.
Our emphasis is on studies that directly manipulate cognitive load to ascertain how
doing so affects economic decisions, specifically pertaining to arithmetic performance, risk,
intertemporal choice, healthiness in snack choice, generosity, and strategic behavior, among
others. Table 1 summarizes a number of these studies. While there are many different
methods for inducing cognitive load, most require the participant to hold information in
memory. Harkening Miller (1956), most studies choose to directly manipulate cognitive load
by asking subjects to memorize numbers with 7 or more digits.
De Neys (2006) finds that the ability to spot flawed logical arguments in syllogisms is
lower for individuals given complex dot patterns to memorize than for people given simple
patterns. Sprenger et al. (2011) find a greater rate of violations in probability judgments
when individuals are memorizing longer rather than shorter strings of letters. Rydval (2011)
finds that performance on a time-series forecasting task is lower when individuals are given
the pertinent data sequentially, forcing individuals to retain some information in memory
while doing the task, rather than simultaneously. Benjamin et al. (2013) looked for, but did
not find, evidence that cognitive load statistically reduces performance on SAT-type math
problems (arithmetic, algebra, geometry, and probability). Mani et al. (2013) experimentally
prime rich and poor people to think about a looming car repair that varies in its cost. They
find that priming reduces cognitive performance on IQ tests among poor participants, but
not among well-off participants. The authors conclude that the context of poverty imposes
load and impedes cognitive capacity.
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A number of papers have examined how cognitive load affects decisions involving risk. In
general, most studies indicate that people under cognitive load take fewer risks relative to
those under no cognitive load (Whitney et al., 2008; Gerhardt, 2013; and Benjamin et al.,
2013). This finding seems consistent with papers that have examined how cognitive ability
affects risk-taking. Individuals with lower cognitive ability, as measured by IQ tests, are
found to be more risk-averse (Oechssler et al., 2009; Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010;
Beauchamp et al., 2012; Benjamin et al., 2013). Of course, other methods have also been
used to manipulate reasoning and the results do not always replicate. For instance, alcohol
and sleep deprivation are thought to lower cognitive ability, but Corazzini et al. (2014) find
no effect of alcohol consumption on risk taking in the lab, while McKenna et al. (2007) find
that sleep deprivation leads to more risk neutral behavior. Similarly, Butler et al. (2013) find
that risk tolerance increases when individuals are primed to rely on intuition rather than
reasoning.
The evidence on how cognitive load affects impatience is somewhat mixed. An influential
paper by Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) finds that individuals memorizing a 7-digit number were
22% more likely than individuals memorizing a 2-digit number to choose chocolate cake over
fruit salad. The authors proposed that the cognitive load task increased reliance on intuitive
choice and thus led to more impulsive behavior. Other papers similarly find that cognitive
load is associated with poorer dietary choice (Ward and Mann, 2000; Zimmerman and Shi-
mog, 2014), the logic being that one is trading off immediate gratification against long-term
costs. Hinson et al. (2003) and Getz (2013) study impatience over monetary outcomes using
standard intertemporal questions to find that people exhibit more impatient behavior when
subjected to cognitive load. However, Franco-Watkins et al. (2006) re-examine the data
from Hinson et al. (2003) and conclude that people are not necessarily more impatient when
under cognitive load, but rather subjects simply make more random decisions, as might be
expected given their degraded logic skills. In fact, Franco-Watkins et al. (2010) provide
direct experimental support for cognitive load leading to more random behavior rather than
impatient behavior. This runs somewhat in contrast with the literature on cognitive ability.
Shamosh and Gray (2008) conduct a literature review and a meta-analysis and conclude that
higher cognitive ability is associated with less impatience. Oechssler et al. (2009) also find
a similar pattern; low Cognitive Reflective Task (CRT) scores are associated with greater
impatience. Corazzinni et al. (2014) find that alcohol consumption makes people less patient.
We are not aware of studies that vary cognitive load when examining anchoring effects,
but at least two studies look at the relationship between cognitive ability and anchoring.
Oechssler et al. (2009) find no relationship between CRT score and anchoring and Bergman
et al. (2010) find that people with greater cognitive skills are less susceptible to anchoring.
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The effect of cognitive load on other behaviors, such as generosity, is unclear. Hauge
et al. (2014) and Cappelletti et al. (2011) find that being under cognitive load does not
affect generosity in the dictator and ultimatum games, respectively. Benjamin et al. (2013)
and to some degree Cornelissen et al. (2011), find that subjects under cognitive load are
more selfish in dictator games, while Roch et al. (2000) find people under cognitive load are
more selfish in common resource games. On the other hand, Van den Bos et al. (2006) and
Schulz et al. (2014) find the opposite effect: generosity increases when subjects are under
cognitive load. This is in line with Rand et al. (2012) who find that across ten experimental
designs, subjects who reach their decisions more quickly are more cooperative. As it relates
to cognitive ability, Chen et al. (2013) find that better scores on SAT math questions are
associated with more generosity whereas higher GPAs are associated with more selfishness.
The alcohol study of Corazzinni et al. (2014) finds that drinking makes people less generous.
The application of cognitive load to strategic games is interesting, though complicated.
In such cases, players must not only compute the optimal strategy, but must also form beliefs
about the behavior of their opponent, and beliefs about their opponent’s beliefs (see Deck
and Jahedi, 2015a for a related discussion on impatience). In games of dominance like the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), or games that can be solved iteratively (Milinski and Wedekind,
1998; Carpenter et al., 2013), cognitive load is associated with decreased cooperation rates
in the PD game and lower performance in iteratively solvable games. In complex games such
as a repeated PD setting, Duffy and Smith (2014) find that cognitive load lowers strategic
sophistication as measured by endgame play. Allred et al. (2015a) argue that cognitive
load acts in strategic games by simultaneously decreasing computational accuracy and the
accuracy of beliefs in others’ actions.
Cognitive load and cognitive ability have been examined in several other settings as well.
In social settings that require cognitive resources, Gilbert et al. (1988) find that the ability
of individuals to use situational cues suffers. Greene et al. (2008) find that for utilitarian
judgments, such as the acceptability of killing a baby to save the lives of others, response
times, but not necessarily choices, are impacted by cognitive load. Block et al. (2010) conduct
a meta-study that looks at how cognitive load affects individual’s estimation of time duration.
The authors find that accuracy in estimation times depends on whether or not the person
knows if she will have to make a judgment before completing the task. Allred et al. (2015a)
find that people under higher load tend to evaluate the length of a line as closer to mean of
a comparison group, exacerbating central tendency bias.
In sum, the aggregate choices of respondents under cognitive load tend to be no better,
and often worse, than the aggregate choices of individuals who are not under cognitive
load across a wide range of economically relevant activities. Overall, the research suggests
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that observed behavior can be swayed by access to cognitive resources, and that it is not
appropriate to think about individuals acting upon one single risk attitude or one level of
impatience.
3 Experiment 1
3.1 Methodology
A total of 112 participants were recruited for the 90 minute study. The experiment was
conducted across six sessions at the Behavioral Business Research Lab (BBRL) at the Uni-
versity of Arkansas. The show-up payment was $10 and participants were paid an additional
$13.31 on average. Prior to the start of the experiment, all participants in each session were
seated at a computer and asked to read the experimental instructions.3 The instructions were
interactive and included practice questions for each type of task that would appear in the
experiment, along with a quiz asking participants to correctly identify the payoff associated
with making various choices.
The four main types of tasks in this experiment were (1) arithmetic, (2) risk, (3) im-
patience, and (4) anchoring. For each task, many different sub-tasks could be encountered.
Table 2 describes the sub-tasks and methods that were used to create specific realizations.
Sample screen shots displaying questions for each task are shown in Figure 1.
Once a participant had finished reading the instructions, the 80 period experiment began.
In each period, a number appeared for three seconds on the participant’s computer screen.
Participants were asked to keep this number in their memory. Next, the subject was given a
randomly determined task to complete. The task was generated at random with replacement,
meaning that different subjects would complete different versions of each task resulting in
a different total number of observations for each task type. Once the task was completed,
participants were asked to recall their number. If they recalled the number correctly, their
memorization payoff for the period was $22. Otherwise it was $0. The payoff associated
with memorization was intentionally higher than the average payoff for the main task so
that participants with limited memory would devote their main attention to memorization
rather than the other task. This increased the likelihood that our cognitive load manipulation
would have the desired effect. Some subjects were shown 8-digit numbers to memorize in
periods 1 - 40 and then shown 1-digit numbers to memorize in periods 41 - 80. Other
3The experiment was programmed and conducted in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The in-
structions, which include screen shots of the pages that were shown, can be found online at
https://sites.google.com/site/salarj/research
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Task Screen Shots of Sample Choices Payment
Arithmetic
$12
(if correct)
Risk
Lottery
Outcome
Impatience
$12
(flat rate)
Anchoring
$12
(within five)
Figure 1: Sample Screen Shots for Different Tasks
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Table 2: Tasks in Experiment 1.
MAIN TASK
sub-task Description of how random tasks are generated
ARITHMETIC paid $12 for correct answer.
Addition Add a1 + a2 where integer a1 ∼ U{11, ..., 99} and integer a2 ∼ U{1, ..., 9}.
Multiplication Multiply m1 ×m2 where integer m1 ∼ U{13, ..., 19} and integer m2 ∼ U{5, ..., 9}.
RISK paid based on outcome
in Gain Domain Integer g drawn from ∼ U{8, ..., 15}. Given additional endowment of 2.
Binary choice of guaranteed g or 50/50 chance of receiving (2g + 2, 0)
in Loss Domain Integer g drawn from ∼ U{8, ..., 15}. Given additional endowment of 2g + 4.
Binary choice of guaranteed −g − 2 or 50/50 chance of receiving (0,−2g − 2)
IMPATIENCE paid $12 so choice is hypothetical
Binary choice between $100 at time T or $F at time T + t
where F equally likely to be {105, 110, 115, 125}
where T is equally likely to be {Today, In One Week, In One Month}.
and t is equally likely to be {Day, Week, Month}, except when
T =“In One Month,” when, t is equally likely to be {Day, Week}.*
ANCHORING paid for $12 if within five of the accurate count
Subject first picks an integer between 20 and 80 and then must count S’s
in a 10 by 10 table consisting of 5’s and S’s. The # of S’s is equally likely to be:
(integer ∼ U{0, ..., 30}), (integer ∼ U{31, ..., 70}), (integer ∼ U{71, ..., 100}).
* When designing this experiment, we provided subjects with a visual so that it would make it easier to
envision the dates between payoffs (see Figure 1). The image that accompanied the tasks was a six-week
calendar and thus could not support a decision spanning two months.
subjects first memorized 1-digit numbers and then memorized 8-digit numbers. The order
was randomly determined for each subject.
Participants were paid for exactly one of their responses, a fact that was explained to them
in advance. At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly chose one of the 80 periods
to use in determining the subject’s payoff. For the randomly selected period, the computer
then randomly determined if the subject would be compensated for the memorization or
the main task. Randomly selecting one task for payment was intended to eliminate wealth
effects. If subjects do not view each task in isolation, then it is possible that subjects regard
the payments for the decision task and the memory task as substitutes. However, we do not
believe that such wealth effects, if they exist, are very large.
There are two main ways that wealth effects can differ across 1- and 8-digit treatments.
First, subjects may frame the memory task and decision task in a given period as isolated
from the tasks in other periods. This would imply that decisions in the 1-digit treatment
would be associated with higher expected wealth than decisions in the 8-digit treatment
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and might reduce the overall effort level exerted by subjects. However, performance in the
math task is 12% better in the 1-digit treatment, indicating that subjects are not shirking
in those tasks where their expected wealth is higher. Second, subjects may have inaccurate
beliefs regarding their future memory performance. If so, their expected wealth would change
over the course of the experiment as they learn about their own memory performance. In
such cases, we would expect to see differences in performance between those who started the
experiment with the 8-digit treatment and those who started the experiment with the 1-digit
treatment. However, we do not observe significant differences in behavior due to ordering.
Before presenting the results we provide a brief explanation for the specific tasks that we
selected. Our primary interest is in how cognitive load impacts individual decision making
and thus our tasks are limited to those activities measuring core preferences and ability
rather than strategic or social concerns. In part this is due to the fact that strategic and
social concerns may depend not only on the cognitive load of the decision maker, but also on
the decision maker’s beliefs about how cognitive load impacts others as well. The Arithmetic
task is used as a control to identify whether the number memorization activity actually does
manipulate cognitive load. Both addition and multiplication problems are included to gauge
the severity of the manipulation on decision making. If memorizing a large number does not
affect ability to do multiplication then a more extreme cognitive load manipulation would
be warranted. At the same time, if people cannot do simple addition when memorizing a
number then the manipulation might be too strong for choices to be meaningful.
Our Risk task was designed to be a simple choice between a safe and risky option: subjects
had to choose between a low-paying safe option that always appeared on the left-hand side
of the screen and a higher-paying risky option that always appeared on the right-hand side
of the screen (Gerhardt, 2013; Benjamin et al., 2013, discuss comparisons of choices over safe
and risky options verses two risky options). The higher-paying risky option had an expected
value that was always $1 higher than that of the safe option.4 Furthermore, the Risk task
covered both the gain and loss domain. In the gain domain, gambles always returned positive
outcomes whereas in the loss domain, gambles always returned negative outcomes. Since
participants were not asked to pay money out of pocket, we follow the standard procedure
that risks framed as losses were accompanied by a large-enough endowment to cover any
losses. In fact, the endowments in both domains were assigned such that the choice between
safe and risky choices gave rise to the identical payoffs. In that sense, the difference between
the conditions is a mere framing effect. If subjects realize this or do not internalize the initial
4In our risk tasks, the sure option returned an average payment of $9.50 whereas the lottery option
returned an average 50/50 gamble of gaining $21 or gaining $0 (EV = $10.50). Under the standard model
where people have constant relative risk aversion and have a lifetime wealth of $100,000, a person will only
choose the sure option over the gamble if their risk aversion coefficient is greater than 1825!
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endowment, then they may perceive both types of risk tasks to be in the gain domain.
Our Impatience task was done for hypothetical stakes and always offered an option be-
tween $100 at an early date that appeared on the left-hand side of the screen, and an option
for a larger amount at a future date that always appeared on the right-hand side of the
screen. This task was intentionally made to be hypothetical so to get at time preferences
without being concerned about the uncertainty related to future payments (see Deck and
Jahedi, 2015b for a discussion). While this design removes the uncertainty associated with
measuring time preferences, it potentially reduces the weight of each decision given that
choices are hypothetical.5
Finally, our Anchoring task is based on the Wheel-of-Fortune task introduced in Tversky
and Kahneman (1974), where a randomly generated number was found to influence subjects’
answers to an independent question. We created an abstract version of the task to allow for
scalability in a repeated setting.6
3.2 Results
We examine how a cognitive load manipulation affects the choices made in Arithmetic, Risk,
Impatience, and Anchoring tasks. In Table 3, we report the summary statistics by treatment,
and the data are presented graphically in Figure A.1 of the Appendix. For the Arithmetic
task, performance in the addition and multiplication problems are reported separately. For
the Risk task, risks framed in gains and losses are reported separately. For the Impatience
task, options involving an immediate payoff and only future payoffs are reported separately.
A total of 22 observations are dropped in the risky choice tasks (10 in the gain frame, 12 in
the loss frame) and a total of 235 observations are dropped in the Anchoring task since no
decision was made prior to time running out.
A comparison of the raw means in the table indicate that digit recall was significantly
higher for those in the 1-digit group than for those in the 8-digit group (difference = 53.1%,
p-value < 0.001 using a two-sample unpaired t-test). This result signals that 8-digit memo-
rization is difficult. To test whether our cognitive load manipulation had its intended effect,
we can compare individuals’ performance in the Arithmetic task, which is objectively mea-
surable. For the Arithmetic task, addition performance was not affected by cognitive load
(difference = 0.82%, p-value = 0.531 using a two-sample unpaired t-test), whereas perfor-
5One adverse result of this design is that individuals may learn to choose the option on the right-hand
side of the page to save time since the ‘Continue’ button is located in the same general area of the screen.
6Because it is easy to determine the number of S’s in a table of 100 characters if there are very few or very
many, we intended to make such realizations rare by increasing the likelihood that the number of S’s was
moderate, but we inadvertently used a distribution to determine the number of S’s that was nearly uniform
(see Table 2). Subjects were not informed of this generation process.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Experiment 1.
1-digit 8-digit
Percentage
# of Responses
Digit Memorization 96.3% 43.3%
4480 4480
Correct Addition 97.8% 96.9%
312 294
Correct Multiplication 71.6% 55.9%
634 639
Risky Choice (gains) 59.5% 52.7%
662 662
Risky Choice (loss) 45.7% 43.9%
588 640
Early Option 35.8% 31.6%
(today vs. future) 452 459
Early Option 30.2% 25.9%
(future vs. future) 871 815
S-Count within 50.1% 40.9%
Anchoring Range 799 876
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mance in multiplication did differ (difference = 15.7%, p-value < 0.001 using a two-sample
unpaired t-test).7
We conduct the remaining analysis in two parts. First, we analyze the effect of cognitive
load on each task separately. To simplify the analysis, the data for all questions in each
main task are pooled. That is to say, for the Arithmetic task, addition and multiplication
problems are reported together; for the Risk task, gambles in gains and gambles in losses
are combined; and for the Impatience task, short-run and long-run tradeoffs are similarly
pooled. We discuss the rationale for pooling below, and include the non-pooled regression
results in Table A.1 of the Appendix. Second, we take advantage of the panel structure of
our data to identify those individuals who are most sensitive to cognitive load as measured
by the change in their arithmetic performance across the 1-digit and 8-digit treatments. We
then test whether those identified as most sensitive to cognitive load have a relatively larger
change in performance across all of the tasks.
For the Risk task, cognitive load lowers risk-taking overall, regardless of whether the risk
is framed as a gain or a loss; though, the initial risk-taking level as well as the magnitude
of the effect differs across gains and losses. Prospect theory predicts that people are more
risk-averse in gains and more risk-loving in losses; however, we find no evidence supporting
this proposition in our data. Indeed, risk aversion is slightly higher in the loss frame. Our
inability to find risk-loving behavior in losses is consistent with Whitney et al. (2008) and
Benjamin et al. (2013) who similarly find that risk-taking does not differ across gain and
loss frames. For the Impatience task, cognitive load increased the likelihood of choosing
the future option, regardless of whether the early option was available immediately or in
the future. The Impatience task also has theoretically different predictions depending on
sub-task. Laibson (1997) and others argue that people are more impatient when making
a tradeoff between today and a future period than when making a tradeoff between two
future periods. However, we find no evidence for such β-δ preferences: difference in behavior
between those making decisions regarding today and a future period are the same as those
making a decision between two similarly spaced future periods.8 Our inability to find patient
7Table A.1 shows that the difference is significant, even after clustering the standard errors by subject.
8Table 3 gives the appearance that there is evidence for hyperbolic discounting. A closer look at the
data, however suggests otherwise. There is obviously evidence for delta-discounting: as the payment for the
delayed option is pushed even further into the future, people choose the earlier option. However, there is
not much evidence for beta-discounting: when the early option is today, people do not seem to be any more
impatient than when the early option is in the future. The reason that the table shows people are more
likely to choose the Early Option when making a choice between today and a future period is because there
are proportionally more observations with a one-month delay as compared to the future periods (see Table
2 for a description of the design). Once we control for the date of the delayed option in a regression, there is
no difference between the impatience exhibited for decisions having a today choice and impatience exhibited
for decisions having only future choices.
16
behavior for future tradeoffs is consistent with the cognitive load findings of Benjamin et
al. (2013). In the Risk and Impatience tasks, the null hypothesis that the parameter on
the treatment effects in Table A.1 is the same across sub-tasks cannot be rejected based on
a generalized Hausman specification test (for the Risk task, p=0.2957; for the Impatience
task, p=0.9870). In the Arithmetic task, the treatment effect does differ based on addition
or multiplication task (for the Math task, p <0.0001). However, we choose to pool this
data as well, for the sake of consistency; though our identification is mainly based off of the
multiplication treatment.
An OLS regression is run on each task separately (Arithmetic, Risk, Impatience, and
Anchoring) on a dummy variable for the 8-digit treatment.9 All regressions include subject-
fixed effects and cluster standard errors by participant, although the results do not depend on
that.10 The treatment effect of cognitive load on each of the four main tasks can be found in
Model 1a, Model 2a, Model 3a, and Model 4a respectively of Table 4. The results from Wald
tests indicate that in the 8-digit treatment as compared to the 1-digit treatment, participants
perform 12.2% worse at arithmetic problems (p < 0.001), are 5.4% more likely to choose the
safe option in the Risk task (p = 0.025), and are 4.1% more likely to choose the later-option in
the Impatience task (p = 0.025). For the Anchoring task, we employ a difference-in-difference
procedure to identify the effect of anchoring on guesses of individuals in the 1-digit and 8-
digit treatments, after controlling for the true number of S’s. A Wald test indicates that the
random number between 20 and 80 input in the first stage significantly influences the guesses
of the 1-digit treatment in the Anchoring task (p = 0.066). For every digit increase in this
number, guesses of subjects in the 1-digit treatment increased by 0.068 units. In contrast,
guesses of subjects in the 8-digit treatment increased by 0.104 units (= 0.068 + 0.034) for
every unit increase in the anchor (a Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the sum of the
slope coefficients equals zero, p-value = 0.042). However, as the coefficient on Anchor ×
8-digit is not significant, this means that we do not find that individuals memorizing an
8-digit number are significantly more likely to anchor. A more detailed breakdown of choices
by sub-task can be found in Figure A.2 of the Appendix.
In the second part of our analysis, we take advantage of the panel structure of our data
set to test whether those individuals that are most sensitive to cognitive load, as measured
9We report the results using a linear probability model because it has a transparent interpretation. Results
from a probit analysis can be found in Table A.2 of the Appendix. It can readily be seen that the findings
do not differ across the regression specifications.
10If we were to run statistical tests without clustering using a t-test or a Mann-Whitney test, the results
would be much more significant. We have opted to cluster the standard errors at the subject level, but it is
possible to cluster it at a broader level, such as at the session level, or at a finer level, such as at the task
level. We have compared the results at different clustering possibilities and it makes little difference. Ideally,
the cluster should be set at the broadest reasonable level, which we thought to be at the subject level.
17
T
ab
le
4:
E
ff
ec
t
of
C
og
n
it
iv
e
L
oa
d
M
an
ip
u
la
ti
on
on
B
eh
av
io
r
in
E
x
p
er
im
en
t
1.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
v
a
ry
a
n
d
a
re
li
st
ed
a
t
th
e
to
p
o
f
ea
ch
co
lu
m
n
.
O
L
S
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
,
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
E
rr
o
rs
C
lu
st
er
ed
b
y
P
a
rt
ic
ip
a
n
t
C
o
r
r
e
c
t
a
t
A
r
it
h
m
e
ti
c
R
is
k
y
C
h
o
ic
e
C
h
o
se
n
E
a
r
li
e
r
O
p
ti
o
n
C
h
o
se
n
G
u
e
ss
fo
r
A
n
c
h
o
r
in
g
T
a
sk
M
o
d
el
1
a
M
o
d
el
1
b
M
o
d
el
1
c
M
o
d
el
2
a
M
o
d
el
2
b
M
o
d
el
2
c
M
o
d
el
3
a
M
o
d
el
3
b
M
o
d
el
3
c
M
o
d
el
4
a
M
o
d
el
4
b
M
o
d
el
4
c
a
ll
n
o
t
se
n
si
ti
v
e
a
ll
n
o
t
se
n
si
ti
v
e
a
ll
n
o
t
se
n
si
ti
v
e
a
ll
n
o
t
se
n
si
ti
v
e
8
-d
ig
it
n
u
m
b
er
-0
.1
2
2
*
*
*
0
.0
3
3
-0
.2
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
4
*
*
-0
.0
3
5
-0
.0
7
1
*
*
-0
.0
4
1
*
*
-0
.0
5
7
*
*
-0
.0
2
7
0
.1
5
9
2
.3
9
1
-2
.3
5
6
[0
.0
2
3
]
[0
.0
2
2
]
[0
.0
2
6
]
[0
.0
2
4
]
[0
.0
3
6
]
[0
.0
3
2
]
[0
.0
1
8
]
[0
.0
2
6
]
[0
.0
2
6
]
[2
.2
9
3
]
[3
.3
1
1
]
[3
.2
0
4
]
A
n
ch
o
r
0
.0
6
8
*
0
.0
5
0
0
.0
9
4
*
[0
.0
3
7
]
[0
.0
5
6
]
[0
.0
4
8
]
A
n
ch
o
r
×
8
d
ig
it
0
.0
3
4
0
.0
0
6
0
.0
6
5
[0
.0
5
0
]
[0
.0
7
0
]
[0
.0
7
0
]
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
S
’s
0
.7
0
8
*
*
*
0
.6
8
8
*
*
*
0
.7
2
9
*
*
*
[0
.0
2
5
]
[0
.0
4
0
]
[0
.0
2
9
]
1
-d
ig
it
A
v
er
a
g
e
0
.8
0
2
0
.7
8
6
0
.8
1
7
0
.5
3
0
0
.5
6
0
0
.5
0
5
0
.3
2
1
0
.2
6
3
0
.3
7
7
S
u
b
je
ct
F
ix
ed
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
R
2
0
.2
3
2
0
.2
8
9
0
.2
2
0
0
.3
0
6
0
.3
1
7
0
.2
8
9
0
.3
1
5
0
.3
1
8
0
.2
8
9
0
.6
7
5
0
.6
6
2
0
.6
8
9
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
8
7
9
8
8
2
9
9
7
2
5
5
2
1
2
1
3
1
3
3
9
2
5
9
7
1
2
7
0
1
3
2
7
1
6
7
5
8
2
4
8
5
1
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
g
iv
en
in
b
ra
ck
et
s
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
1
0
%
,
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
5
%
,
*
*
*
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
1
%
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
ro
w
la
b
el
ed
“
1
-d
ig
it
a
v
er
a
g
e”
co
rr
es
p
o
n
d
s
to
th
e
m
ea
n
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
o
f
th
e
1
-d
ig
it
tr
ea
tm
en
t
g
ro
u
p
.
T
h
is
p
ro
v
id
es
th
e
b
a
se
li
n
e
p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
in
ea
ch
ta
sk
.
18
by the change in arithmetic performance between the 1-digit and 8-digit treatments, are
also more likely to change their behavior in the other three tasks. For each person, we first
calculate the difference between the fraction of multiplication problems correct in the 1-digit
treatment and the 8-digit treatment. Then we conduct a median split of the data. We refer
to the group whose multiplication scores are most diminished in the 8-digit treatment (as
compared to the 1-digit treatment) as sensitive, and those whose multiplication scores are
least affected by cognitive load as insensitive.11 We re-conducted the regression analysis for
both groups separately.12 The results can be found in Table 4 for each task. Models 1b, 2b,
3b, and 4b are for the insensitive subjects and Models 1c, 2c, 3c, and 4c are for the sensitive
subjects.
The split sample regression results indicate that the individuals for whom cognitive load
affects arithmetic performance the most are the same people for whom cognitive load affects
other behavior. In the Risk task, sensitive individuals are 7.1% less likely to take risk under
cognitive load, a significant change. For the insensitive subjects, risk taking behavior is not
different when memorizing a 1-digit or an 8-digit number. In the Anchoring task, the guesses
of sensitive individuals increase by 0.159 units (= 0.094+0.065) for every unit increase in the
anchor. Insensitive subjects are not affected.13 For the Impatience task, however, we again
find an odd result. Recall that we found people become more patient under cognitive load.
Those individuals whose multiplication performance is least affected by a large number are
the most likely to become patient. This casts additional doubt to the hypothetical patience
task and led us to conduct Experiment 2 which includes an incentivized Impatience task.
We also check how correctly recalling the number affects task performance when under
cognitive load (see Figure A.2 of the Appendix). Participants have a much harder time
recalling 8-digit numbers (43% recall rate) than they do recalling 1-digit numbers (96% recall
rate). If a participant realizes that he or she has forgotten the number and no longer devotes
11Alternatively, it is possible to use a continuous measure of the performance drop in the multiplication
task to define the level of overload sensitivity. Each method has its own strength. The median split is easy to
interpret and assumes only a level difference in behavior across treatment. In contrast, the performance drop
provides a potentially richer measure for overload sensitivity, while implicitly assuming that the performance
varies linearly in the difference in multiplication scores. We have run the analysis both ways and the results
do not change with the definition of sensitivity that was employed.
12Alternatively, we also conducted a difference-in-difference regression to test whether cognitive load sensi-
tivity affects treatment effects. This method provides nearly identical results as the Hausman test described
below.
13To test the difference between Model 2b and 2c (as well as 3b and 3c; 4b and 4c), the simplest way is
to use a generalized Hausman test to check whether the coefficient on 8-digit number is different across the
two specifications. It is not different in the Risk task, the Impatience task, or the Anchoring task (Hausman
p-value of 0.4442, p-value of 0.3876, p-value of 0.7037 respectively). Therefore we cannot conclude that the
groups behave differently to the treatment. However, our results are suggestive that the overall effect is
being driven by those who are overload sensitive.
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cognitive resources towards its memorization, then in effect, they are not under a cognitive
load and their decision in the 8-digit task should resemble their decision in the 1-digit task.
To test for this, we conduct regressions that not only test for the effect of receiving an 8-digit
number, but also for the marginal effect of correctly recalling that number. Of course, we
realize that those who can consistently recall an 8-digit number correctly may differ in their
general abilities or attitudes in the main tasks than those who cannot. For that reason, we
also include subject-fixed effects in our regressions. The results can be found in Table A.3 of
the Appendix.14 These regressions also include sub-task-fixed effects and time-fixed effects
for good measure; although their inclusion does not affect the significance of the results.
For each of the four main tasks, those who correctly recalled the 8-digit number display an
additional effect on behavior that is in the same direction as receiving the 8-digit number.
However, except for the Risk task, we cannot significantly differentiate the mean difference
in behavior of those receiving an 8-digit number, and those correctly recalling the 8-digit
number.
We also examine how being in the 8-digit treatment affects the associated payoff in each
task of the experiment. The results appear in Table A.4 of the Appendix. Payoffs noticeably
decrease when individuals are in the 8-digit treatment. This effect is mainly driven by the
reduced recall rates and the inability to accurately compute multiplication problems, but
the remaining tasks contribute somewhat to the discrepancy as well. People in the 8-digit
treatment actually made more money in the Risk task than those in the 1-digit treatment
despite choosing the gamble less often. This is because on average, the gambles in the 8-digit
treatment are more successful (55%) than the gambles in the 1-digit treatment (45%) due
to random variation.
4 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 finds that, for a hypothetical time preference task, people who memorized
larger numbers appear to be significantly more patient than those who memorize small
numbers. Further examination indicates that it is the people least affected by the cognitive
load manipulation who are responding in this way. We suspect this pattern is a result of
participants ignoring the question and selecting the option that required the least physical
and cognitive effort. Therefore, we conducted Experiment 2, which involved an intertemporal
decision with real cash stakes. Experiment 2 also includes a intertemporal choice task over
14We checked for time effects. Subjects seem to display a trend towards improvement in each of the
tasks, including the 8-digit number memorization task as time passes. However, there is no treatment-time
interaction effect as the coefficient on Period × 8-digit is zero.
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consumption where subjects chose between a small serving of a snack now and a larger
serving in the future (e.g., 12 oz. package of M&M’s today vs. 19 oz. package of M&M’s in
one week). Finally, Experiment 2 included two variations of the snack choice experiment of
Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999). The choice was always between a healthy and unhealthy snack,
and either the snack would be served that day, or the snack would be served the following
week.15
4.1 Methodology
A total of 87 new subjects participated in Experiment 2. Similar to Experiment 1, in each
period the participants observed a number to memorize, then made a decision, and were then
asked to recall the memorized number. There were 51 periods and four types of possible
decisions: (1) Money Impatience task, (2) Consumption Impatience task, (3) Immediate
Snack Choice task, and (4) Delayed Snack Choice task.
Conducting an experiment with intertemporal choices and real stakes necessarily means
that a subject may not be paid until some future date. If subjects view future payments
to be more uncertain than immediate payments, then the measure of impatience will be
intertwined with subjects’ risk attitudes. In order to minimize uncertainty about future
payments, participants in Experiment 2 were recruited for two sessions exactly one week
apart. During recruitment subjects were told that the first session would take approximately
one hour and pay a show-up fee of $5, whereas the second session would take approximately
10 minutes and pay a show-up fee of $10. Subjects made all of their decisions during the first
session and the only purpose of the second session was so that subjects knew they would be
returning to the laboratory one week later when making intertemporal choices during the
first part of the experiment (all but one person actually returned one week later). Hence,
all of the choices in Experiment 2 involved compensation collected either at the time the
decision was made, or in exactly one week.
The Money Impatience task involved choices of the form $X today or $Y in one week.16
While most of the choices were such that X < Y , there were three choices for which X > Y ;
15In the case of healthy and unhealthy snacks, the exact items used appear in Table A.5 in the Appendix.
A number of different factors were considered when choosing the “healthy” and “unhealthy” food items. The
number of calories contained in the item loomed large in the decision, but we also considered what items
were readily available in case we needed to re-stock during the experiment, the size of the item so that it
could easily be transported out of the experiment, and that the snacks were all in a similar price range.
16In our Money Impatience task, the immediate option was on average about $11 whereas the next-week
option was on average $11.75. This implies a weekly discount factor of 0.936. Under the standard model
where people discount each period of time at a constant rate, this rate of discounting equates to a yearly
discount factor of 0.032. In other words, a person choosing the immediate option would be indifferent between
having $100 immediately or $95,000 in two years.
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these served as verification questions to check the extent to which subjects were paying
attention.17 The Consumption Impatience task offered subjects the binary choice of a small
serving today or a larger serving in one week. Immediate Snack Choice tasks presented
subjects with two food options – one healthy and one unhealthy – and the subject decided
which they would rather have that day. Delayed Snack Choice tasks were similar, but the
subject’s selected snack was not provided until the following week. Shiv and Fedorikhin
(1999) find that observing the actual food is an important factor affecting snack choice.
Therefore, for the Immediate Snack Choice task, subjects were presented with the snack
packages. For Delayed Snack Choice task, subjects were presented with pictures of the snack
packages. For consistency across the four tasks, any item, including cash, that would be
provided that day was presented physically while pictures were used for any item that would
be provided in one week. Figure A.3 of the Appendix depicts sample images across each
task; a full list of the options that participants faced can be found in Table A.5.
To facilitate presenting subjects with physical items, Experiment 2 was hand run instead
of computerized as in Experiment 1. For this reason a single order of choices was prede-
termined randomly and then used for every subject. Hence every subject saw the same
choice options in Experiment 2, which differs from Experiment 1, where tasks were ran-
domly generated. During a session, seven to thirteen participants were seated at individual
workstations with privacy dividers on either side but not to the front. In each period, an
experimental assistant displayed a number to a participant for three seconds, after which
the assistant moved to the next participant. Participants were asked to keep this number
in their memory. Next, a second experimental assistant walked to the participant holding
a tray displaying two options (physical items or pictures) and provided the participant a
pen. The participant had to mark which of the two options they preferred. Finally, a third
experimental assistant walked to the participant approximately 30 seconds after the first
experimental assistant had, handed the subject a pen and asked them to recall the number
that they were asked to memorize on a sheet of paper. The second and third assistants used
different, non-traditional colored pens so that subjects could not record their memorized
number before they were instructed to do so.18
As in Experiment 1, cognitive load was manipulated within-subject by varying the size
of the number the participant had to memorize; however, in Experiment 2 subjects were
shown either no number (0-digit number), a 2-digit number, or an 8-digit number. In part,
17More money today should be preferable to less money in the future. For these questions, we expected
that nearly everybody chooses the earlier amount. We added these verification questions to make sure that
subjects were attentive. If subjects relied on rules of thumb, such as “always choose the future payment,”
then their answers to these questions would deviate from our expectation.
18A video of this procedure is available upon request.
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this change from Experiment 1 was done for consistency with the snack choice experiments
of Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) and in part it was done to determine if even a small cognitive
load would have an effect on decision making. A total of 8 sessions were run. For half of the
sessions, participants were shown 8-digit numbers for the first 17 periods, no number for the
next 17 periods, and 2-digit numbers for the last 17 periods. The order was reversed in the
other half of the sessions so the two levels of cognitive load were always separated by the no
cognitive load phase. If the subject recalled the number correctly or did not have a number
to memorize, their memorization payoff for the period was $15. The memorization payoff
was smaller than in Experiment 1 because the duration of the experiment was shorter
Participants were paid for only one of their decisions, just as in Experiment 1. At the end
of the experiment, each participant chose an index card labeled 1-51 that determined which
of the 51 periods would be used to determine their compensation. The procedure of selecting
a numbered card ensured that no two subjects in a session were owed the same product, thus
limiting the inventory the researchers had to have on hand. Next, the experimenter randomly
determined if the subject was to be compensated for the memorization task or the other task
in the selected period.19
4.2 Results
We examine how a cognitive load manipulation affects subjects’ choices in: (1) a Money
Impatience task, (2) a Consumption Impatience task, (3) an Immediate Snack Choice task,
and (4) a Delayed Snack Choice task. The data for each main task is presented separately.20
Table 5 presents the mean behavior in each decision task across the treatments (see Figure
A.4 of the Appendix for a graphical representation). The outcomes for the three verification
questions meant to check for attentiveness, are included at the bottom of the table, though
we do not include these questions in any of the analysis that follows. The 0-digit treatment
does not require a number to be memorized; the 2-digit treatment has a recall accuracy of
98.4% while the 8-digit treatment has a recall accuracy of 63.0% (difference = 35.4%, p-value
< 0.001 using a two-sample unpaired t-test). Note that the recall rate for 8-digit numbers
in Experiment 2 is about 20 percentage points higher than it is in Experiment 1 (43.3%),
suggesting that participants may have viewed the tasks in Experiment 2 to be easier than
those in Experiment 1.
OLS regressions were run to look at how behavior in the Money Impatience task, the
19This random process was done by rolling a standard 6-sided die. If a 1, 2 or 3 was rolled, the subject
was paid based on the memorization task; otherwise the subject was paid for the other task completed in
the selected period.
20A breakdown of the results by sub-task can be found online at
https://sites.google.com/site/salarj/research
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Table 5: Summary Table for Experiment 2.
0-digit 2-digit 8-digit
Percentage
# of Responses
Digit Memorization – 98.4% 63.0%
1392 1392 1392
Took Early Option 43.1% 47.1% 50.0%
for Money 348 348 348
Took Early Option 35.6% 35.9% 36.2%
for Consumption 348 348 348
Chose Unhealthy 54.3% 56.3% 56.3%
Option (today) 348 348 348
Chose Unhealthy 56.3% 60.3% 60.6%
Option (future) 348 348 348
Verification Questions (dropped from analysis)
Digit Memorization 100% 95.4% 69.0%
87 87 87
Took Early Option 100% 93.1% 93.1%
for Money 87 87 87
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Consumption Impatience task, the Immediate Snack Choice task, and the Delayed Snack
Choice task differed across the 0-digit, 2-digit, and 8-digit treatments. The regressions results
in Table 6 include subject-fixed effects and have standard errors clustered by participant.
The results are in line with the summary statistics listed in Table 5: cognitive load only
affects behavior in the Money Impatience task. The results from a Wald test indicate that
those in the 8-digit treatment chose the impatient outcome 6.9% more often (p = 0.010) than
those with no number memorization task. There is no statistical difference in the choice of
the impatient option between the 2-digit and 8-digit treatments (p = 0.397). The results do
not change substantively when the analysis is conducted using probit regressions (see Table
A.6 of the Appendix).
For the Consumption Impatience task, it is apparent that there is no noticeable difference
in the mean behavior of those memorizing 0-digit, 2-digit, and 8-digit numbers. Regardless
of digit length, about 36% of participants chose the less-consumption-today option. While
one might expect individuals to behave more impatiently for consumption goods than for
monetary goods, we do not find this to be the case in our study. We believe, however,
that this might be due to the mechanics of package size differences for products in the
experiment. For the consumption goods, the size of the immediate consumption bundle was
on average 69% smaller than the size of the future consumption bundle; this represents a
much greater rate of return than in the cash tasks where the average difference was only 6%.
This difference in package size was probably so large that participants likely felt a strong
preference for either the small or large bundle. With strong enough preferences, cognitive
load is unlikely to sway behavior.
For the remaining two tasks, each involving the choice between a healthy and unhealthy
snack, the mean difference in behavior across treatments indicates that memorizing a number
of any-length increased the likelihood of choosing the unhealthy option, but not significantly
so. In the Immediate Snack Choice task, subjects chose 2% more unhealthy snacks in the
2-digit and 8-digit treatment as compared to the 0-digit treatment. However, even when
the 2-digit and 8-digit treatments are pooled and the regression is rerun, a Wald test fails
to find a significant difference in behavior across those treatments and the 0-digit treatment
(p = 0.533). In the Delayed Snack Choice task, subjects chose 4% more unhealthy snacks
in the 2-digit and 8-digit treatment as compared to the 0-digit treatment. This result is
not significant: a similar Wald test rejects a difference between the no-memorization and
memorization treatments (p = 0.199). In fact, we fail to replicate the finding that digit-
memorization increases unhealthy snack choice. Indeed, even if we pool the data from the
Immediate and Delayed Snack Choice tasks together (so that we have 2088 snack choice
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decisions)21 and test for a difference between no memorization vs. any digit-memorization
– which gives us the strongest chance of finding a result – we find no significant difference
(difference = 0.031, Wald test p-value = 0.197).
We do not find evidence that performance in each task varied over the course of the
experiment. Table A.7 of the Appendix reports results of nine OLS regressions run for
each task on the following segments of data: periods 1-17, periods 18-34, and periods 35-
51.22 Data for Immediate and Delayed Snack Choice tasks are pooled for power, but there
does not appear to be any differential effect from memorizing numbers across time for any
of the tasks. Interestingly however, people do seem to exhibit more patience in both the
Money Impatience task and the Consumption Impatience task as the experiment progresses
(the constant term is decreasing). A generalized Hausman specification test rejects the
hypothesis that the Constant parameter is equal across the three time periods (p=0.014)
in the Money Impatience task. For the Consumption Impatience task, people are also less
likely to choose the patient option as the experiment progress but not significantly across
treatments (Hausman p = 0.359). There is a non-significant trend to choose more unhealthy
snacks over time (Hausman p = 0.188).
Overall, there does not seem to be much of an effect from being assigned a 2-digit or
8-digit number when it comes to food choice although people are more impatient for money
when subjected to an increased cognitive load.
5 Conclusion
This paper looks at the effect of cognitive load on economic decision making. A survey of
the existing literature suggests that people typically make poorer decisions across a variety
of situations when subjected to increased levels of cognitive load. Our review describes
the findings of studies where cognitive load is imposed through a memorization task, but
comparability is still challenging given the array of methodologies that are used and the fact
that most studies only examine behavior in a single task.
In a series of experimental studies, we employ a standardized format that tests for the
effect of cognitive load on multiple economic tasks at once. We find that memorizing longer
numbers is associated with worse performance on arithmetic questions, less risk-taking,
higher susceptibility to anchoring effects, and more impatience for money when the choice
is for real stakes. We do not find any evidence that cognitive load increases impatience as
21In contrast, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) who identify the effect, do so with about 80 observations.
22There does not seem to be much learning occurring. In addition to splitting the data into three equal
parts, we also included a (period x 8-digit) interaction term for each of the four tasks as a robustness check.
The estimated coefficient for this interaction was 0.00 for each of the tasks.
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measured by selecting unhealthy snacks over healthy snacks in contrast with some of the
earlier findings in the literature. The results that we attain are generally consistent with
the findings from other studies that look at the effect of cognitive load on specific decision
making (see Table 1) though the magnitude of our effects are typically smaller than those
found in psychology studies.
Studies that only look at how cognitive load affects risk-taking (Gerhardt, 2013) or affects
impatience (Getz, 2013) cannot take a stand on whether cognitive load leads to better or
worse decisions nor can they determine if people who are most affected by cognitive load on
one type of task are the same people who are most affected by cognitive load in a different
type of task. Like Benjamin et al. (2013) we include arithmetic questions as one of the
decision tasks. Arithmetic questions have a verifiable correct answer, a feature that allows
us to objectively determine whether people are being affected by cognitive load. While
the manipulation in Benjamin et al. (2013) did not affect quantitative performance, our
manipulation did, suggesting that our subjects were under cognitive load when making other
types of decisions. Further, we find that those individuals whose arithmetic performance is
most affected by cognitive load are the same individuals who become more risk averse and
more impacted by anchoring when under increased cognitive load. This provides strong
evidence that cognitive load is fundamentally harming an individual’s ability to effectively
make choices.
Our findings are in line with many of the predictions of dual-system theory (Loewenstein
and O’Donoghue, 2004; Fudenberg and Levine, 2006),23 yet more research is necessary to
pinpoint the exact mechanism by which cognitive load impairs choice. One possibility is that
cognitive load simply generates more random choices rather than pushing preferences towards
impulsive behavior (Franco-Watkins et al., 2006; Andersson et al., 2013). Indeed, in our
experiment, aggregate behavior in the Risk and Money Impatience tasks can be interpreted
as being ‘more random’ under cognitive load – in both tasks on aggregate, behavior in the
23In Loewenstein and ODonoghue (2004), the two systems are referred to as the affective and deliberate
systems whereas in Fudenberg and Levine (2006), the systems are referred to as short-run and long-run selves.
Depending on the way the models are structured, each can generate predictions that can explain our findings.
The main application of the costly self-control model proposed by the Fudenberg and Levine is to explain
time-inconsistent choice and preference for commitment devices. It is true that it can explain the effects of
cognitive load on impatience but additional assumptions have to be made; even further assumptions need
to be made to predict how cognitive load might cause people to be more risk-averse. The Loewenstein and
ODonoghue model, on the other hand, has a natural explanation as to how cognitive load affects behavior.
In their model, they hypothesize that deliberation occurs in the pre-frontal cortex, the same part of the
brain that is responsible for “working memory.” Requiring subjects to hold information in their mind for a
short period of time diminishes the performance of the pre-frontal cortex, allowing for the affective system
to dominate the decisionmaking process. Insofar as small-scale risk-aversion and short-run impatience are
intuitive decisions that the deliberative system eventually overrides, then cognitive load will lead to more of
such phenomenon.
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8-digit is closer to 50% (random choice) than in the 1-digit treatment. It should be noted,
however, that an implication of random choice is that people will be less consistent across
their choices. Given that we have repeated observations from each individual under different
levels of cognitive load, we can test the level of internal consistency among individual’s
choices. People do not appear less consistent under cognitive load – indicating the results
are not driven by randomness. Indeed, in just as many situations, aggregate choices seem to
move away from the prediction of randomness.
Consider the Money Impatience task. Every choice to wait for a larger future payment
generates a lower bound on the person’s discount factor whereas each choice to take money
immediately generates an upper bound on the discount factor. We categorize a person as
‘consistent’ under a given cognitive load if there exists a discount factor that simultaneously
satisfies all of the implied bounds from their decisions. Given that there are four Money
Impatience tasks, there are 16 total ways a subject could respond – only five of those are
considered consistent. Overall we observe that 76%, 82%, and 85% of subjects are consistent
when memorizing 0-digit, 2-digit, and 8-digit numbers, respectively. Nominally, memorizing
a larger number is associated with less random behavior on the Money Impatience task.
Furthermore, for the verification questions in the 2- and 8-digit cases, it was rare for anybody
to select having less money in the future, even though random selection would have implied
they choose this option 50% of the time. Likewise, we observed no change in healthy versus
unhealthy snack choice based on treatment. Therefore, we are fairly confident the impact of
cognitive load that we observe is not due to randomness.
A similar exercise can be done for the Risk task in the gain domain.24 We find that
there exists some risk parameter value calculated under constant relative risk aversion that
is consistent with their choices for 54% of subjects when memorizing a 1-digit number in the
gain domain. We find the exact same percent to be consistent when memorizing an 8-digit
number in the gain domain. This indicates that behavior is not simply due to more random
behavior under cognitive load, similar to Gerhardt (2013). We also note that anchoring was
found to be greater when people were under cognitive load, whereas random behavior would
imply that anchors should have less of an effect.
An obvious implication of our study is that many important economic parameters such
as risk, impatience, and anchoring are not stable and that they vary within-person as one’s
cognitive load changes. The same person who appears very patient when they are under
no cognitive load could appear quite impatient when their mind is occupied. This within-
person difference in behavior for the same economic activity raises the question of whether
24For risks in the loss domain, behavior moves away from randomness (away from 50%) in aggregate when
individuals face higher cognitive load.
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we should consider actions such as avoiding risk taking as representing a preference or a
potential mistake. More research is needed to thoughtfully answer this question.
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[8] Besedeš, Tibor, Cary Deck, Sudipta Sarangi, and Mikhael Shor. “Age Effects and
Heuristics in Decision Making.” Review of Economics and Statistics 94(2), (2012): 580-
595.
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Table A.4: The average payoff by main task are shown below.
Experiment 1
1-digit 8-digit
Number Memorization $21.19 $9.52
[0.62] [0.16]
Math (addition) $11.73 $11.63
[0.10] [0.12]
Math (multiplication) $8.59 $6.70
[0.22] [0.24]
Risk (gains) $11.57 $12.43
[0.32] [0.31]
Risk (losses) $12.03 $11.89
[0.32] [0.30]
Impatience $12.00 $12.00
[0.00] [0.00]
Anchoring $5.08 $4.46
[0.19] [0.19]
Experiment 2
0-digit 2-digit 8-digit
Number Memorization $15.00 $14.76 $9.45
[0.00] [0.05] [0.19]
Money Impatience $11.02 $11.69 $11.66
[0.88] [1.12] [1.14]
Consumption Impatience 1430 kcal 1461 kcal 1528 kcal
[971] [791] [771]
Immediate Snack Choice 1505 kcal 1772 kcal 1623 kcal
[394] [1534] [1378]
Delayed Snack Choice 1291 kcal 1253 kcal 1255 kcal
[765] [382] [387]
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Task Sample Sub-tasks
($10, TODAY) ($11, NEXT WEEK)
Money
Impatience
(6 oz., TODAY) (12 oz., NEXT WEEK)
Consumption
Impatience
(Healthy, TODAY) (Unhealthy, TODAY)
Immediate
Snack
Choice
(Healthy, NEXT WEEK) (Unhealthy, NEXT WEEK)
Delayed
Snack
Choice
Figure A.3: Sample Tasks in Experiment 2. TODAY items were physically displayed whereas
NEXT WEEK items were depicted by a picture.
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